


















Introduction and Suggestions on the Chinese 
Securities Credit Rating System from a 
Comparative Perspective 
 
Yinping Xu* and Charlie Xiao-chuan Weng**+ 
Credit rating is a burgeoning industry in China.  However, ever since it 
was established by State Council in 1993, the development of the industry 
in China has faced various impediments.  There are currently three major 
problems hindering its further development, as result of a lack of 
systematic statutory and judicial guidelines.  These problems are:  limited 
competition in the industry, rampant rating shopping and conflicts of 
interest, and limited remedy at law in a suit against a credit rating agency 
for issuing false ratings. 
 
The credit rating industry in the U.S. is dealing with the same problems.  
However, after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was 
granted statutory oversight authority by Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 
of 2006, the situation greatly improved.  By setting forth a clear definition 
and qualitative requirements for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NRSROs), the SEC allowed more rating agencies to 
participate in the market, promoting competition.  This combined with 
SEC’s prohibition on conduct by NRSROs that may involve conflicts of 
interest has curbed rating shopping to a substantial extent.  At the same 
time, the economic crisis and current trends may suggest that rating 
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agencies’ strongest defense in lawsuits against false ratings—the First 
Amendment defense—may be less effective now than before. 
 
The rating industry in China followed a different pattern.  The statutory 
threshold requirement proves too demanding for most rating agencies to 
comply with, therefore barring many potential market participants from 
competing.  In addition, provisions prohibiting rating shopping and 
conflicts of interest are narrowly drawn, targeting only direct conflicts of 
interest.  As for the issue of limited remedy for harms caused by false 
ratings, while freedom of speech is not a valid defense that credit rating 
agencies can raise in Chinese courts, judges’ reluctance to recognize 
intangible harm, even when substantial, combined with an insufficient 
judicial framework overall, make it hard for plaintiffs who have suffered 
from such misbehavior to prevail in lawsuits against false ratings. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
To assist in its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
on November 10, 2001, China has begun to reform inefficient 
management systems established in the Planned Economy era.1  These 
inefficient systems survived the 1978 introduction of a competitive market 
economy.2  Some corporations, such as Haier Group and Lenovo Group 
Limited, which were formed before China’s WTO accession, survived and 
grew into multinational corporate behemoths.  With the incredible 
development velocity of China’s capital market and the improved 
profitability of its domestic corporations, China has become an investment 
magnet, especially under the effects of the current global economic 
depression. 3   All these changes attract both domestic and overseas 
investors to purchase stocks and bonds issued or traded in China.  
Additionally, with the legalization of trading on financial derivatives, such 
as Stock Index Futures, the Chinese capital market is growing 
exponentially both in terms of profitability and potential risks. 
Credit rating—the groundbreaking American invention of the 
early twentieth century—has been widely adopted as a major financial 
device for evaluating such risks and benefits.4  To advance the goal of 
establishing itself as a world-class financial center, China must develop a 
                                                
1 Arnaldo M. Gonçalves, China's Swing from a Planned Soviet-Type Economy to an 
Ingenious Socialist Market Economy: An Account of 50 Years 24, 36 (Centro Argentino de 
Estudios Internacionales, Programa de Asia-Pacífico, Paper No. 019, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=949371.  “Planned economy” is an economic system in which the 
government controls the economy.  In its most extensive form it is referred to as a 
“command economy” or a “centrally planned economy.”  In China, the State Council 
decided what and how much of each item should be produced.  Under such a system, 
“resource prices are in many cases distorted, failing to reflect real value, as many types of 
resources are still priced by the state, operating on the inertia of the old planned economy.”  
Id. at 31. 
2 See Randall Peerenboom, Resistance, Revision and Retrenchment in the Transition to a 
Competitive Market Economy in China 1, 2 (La Trobe Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2008/8, 2008) (describing China’s incremental transition 
to a market economy and noting that China has carved its own path and “never blindly 
followed the principles of the Washington Consensus[.]”), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265114. 
3 In 2006, the Chinese State Council endorsed the construction of the World Financial 
Center in Shanghai, scheduled to be completed in 2020.  Detailed information on this plan, 
as well as other construction and investment projects sponsored by the city and national 
governments, is available at http://sh.eastday.com/jrhy/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 
2010). 
4 See, e.g., Edward I. Altman & Anthony Saunders, The Role of Credit Ratings in Bank 
Capital, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 99–116 
(Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002) (evaluating the use of “traditional” agency ratings in 
the the Basel II reforms).  For an account of the rise of bond ratings in the twentieth-
century U.S. and their effects on capital markets, see also Richard Sylla, An Historical 
Primer on the Business of Credit Rating, in id. 19–40. 
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sound securities credit rating system for investors and financial 
institutions.  Such a securities credit rating system will lower the 
investigatory costs for the security-issuing companies, thereby resulting in 
significant capital savings.5  The primary function of rating agencies 
includes providing professional information by assessing the 
creditworthiness of companies and their debt obligations.6  Ratcheting up 
the credibility and improving the performance of credit rating agencies are 
now the first priorities on the Chinese financial reform agenda.7 
Part II of this Essay provides a basic summary of the current 
situation of the Chinese credit rating system.  Part III discusses some of 
the difficulties that Chinese credit rating agencies face in improving 
creditability, with a focus on systemic problems in market development 
and possible legal remedies.  Part IV analyzes the history and 
development of U.S. credit rating regulation and effects of recently 
introduced rating agency reforms on the regulatory framework, with a 
particular focus on post-Enron reforms.  Part V extensively analyzes 
major U.S. credit rating reforms, focusing on the problems that puzzle 
Chinese observers:  competition, conflict of interest and accountability of 
rating agencies.  Although the legal framework for U.S. credit rating is 
still undergoing significant changes, it provides the Chinese legislature 
and practitioners with important lessons and theoretical foundations.  Part 
VI provides a prescription for Chinese credit rating legislation and 
insights on credit rating adjudication, which can facilitate private 
enforcement and indirectly improve the credibility of rating agencies in 
China. 
II. THE CURRENT SECURITIES CREDIT RATING SYSTEM IN CHINA 
The current Chinese securities credit rating system was 
established in 1993 by the State Council. 8   The Council originally 
                                                
5 See Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United 
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 341, 342 (2006) (explaining rating agencies’ unique 
ability to assess credit worthiness and “facilitate the raising of capital by providing 
information to investors at a lower cost”). 
6 Id.  For a description of the role of credit rating agencies in evaluating issuers and the 
importance of credit ratings to investors, see SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE ROLE 
AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES 
MARKETS: AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 702(B) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 25–
29 (Jan. 2003) [hereinafter SEC Report], available at 
www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf. 
7 See He Minhua [何敏华], Duanqi Rongzi Quan Xinyong Pingji Guongzuo Cunzai de Jige 
Wenti [短期融资券信用评级工作存在的几个问题] [Some Remaining Issues in the Work 
of Credit Rating Short-term Financing Securities], 14 ZHONGGUO JINRONG [中国金融] 
[CHINA FINANCE] 56, 57 (2007) (discussing major problems still affecting Chinese credit 
rating agencies). 
8 See Wang Zhaohui [王昭慧] & Dong Fenyi [董奋义], Dui Woguo Xinyong Pingji Jigou 
2011] SUGGESTIONS ON THE CHINESE CREDIT RATING SYSTEM         221      
 
regulated the issuance of corporate bonds valued over 100 million RMB.9  
In 2004, after several years of ill-reception by the market and confusion of 
the credit rating system, the State Council issued guidelines on reforming 
the capital markets. 10   This triggered a nationwide adoption and 
application of the credit rating system.11  Several regulations were enacted 
by the State Council and its administrative agencies according to the 
authorization of the Securities Law.12 
China’s Securities Law, Article 169(2) provides that: 
 
“[t]he measures for the administration of examination 
and approval of the practice of securities trading services 
by investment consulting institutions, financial advising 
institutions, credit rating institutions, asset appraisal 
institutions and accounting firms shall be formulated by 
the securities regulatory authority under the State 
Council and the relevant administrative departments.”13 
 
                                                                                                           
Cunzai Wenti de Tantao [对我国信用评级机构存在问题的探讨] [Discussion on Current 
Problems of Chinese Credit Rating Agencies], 500 SHANGCHANG XIANDAIHUA [商场现代
化] [MARKET MODERNIZATION], 2007 no. 4, Apr. 2007, at 63–65 (2007) (discussing the 
historical development and problems of the Chinese credit rating system). 
9 Id. 
10 Guowuyuan Guanyu Tuijin Ziben Shichang Gaige Kaifang he Wending Fazhan de 
Ruogan Yijian [国务院关于推进资本市场改革开放和稳定发展的若干意见] [Some 
Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of 
Capital Markets] (promulgated by the St. Council, Jan. 31, 2004, effective Jan. 31, 2004) 
(P.R.C.), 
available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_63148.htm (last visited Apr. 
15, 2010). 
11 See Wang & Dong supra note 8. 
12 To date, these regulations include:  Zhengquan Shichang Zixin Pingji Yewu Guanli 
Zanxing Banfa [证券市场资信评级业务管理暂行办法] [Interim Measures for the 
Administration of the Credit Rating Business Regarding the Securities Market] [hereinafter 
Interim Measures] (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Aug. 24, 2007, 
effective Sep. 1, 2007) (P.R.C.); Zixin Pingji Jigou Chuju Zhengquan Gongsi Zhaiquan 
Xinyong Pingji Baogao Zhunze [资信评级机构出具证券公司债券信用评级报告准则] 
[Guidelines for Issuing Credit Reports for the Bonds of Securities Companies by Credit 
Rating Agencies] (promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Aug. 29, 2003, 
effective Oct. 8, 2003), http://www.winaaa.com/policy/info/200412257390.shtml (P.R.C.); 
Qiye Zhaiquan Guanli Tiaoli [企业债券管理条例 ] [Interim Regulations on 
Administration of Enterprise Bonds] (promulgated by the St. Council, Mar. 27, 1987, 
effective Mar. 27, 1987) (P.R.C.).  
13 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa [中华人民共和国证券法] [Securities 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (2005) [hereinafter 2005 Securities Law], art. 169 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 
2006) (P.R.C.).  
222 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 6 
 
The State Council authorized the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), an administrative agency, to supervise and regulate 
the credit rating agencies.  All securities credit rating agencies in China 
are subject to the authority of CSRC.  According to the Interim Measures 
for the Administration of the Credit Rating Business Regarding the 
Securities Market (Interim Measures), which was enacted by CSRC in 
2007, incorporating securities credit rating agencies shall be approved and 
designated by CSRC first. 14   There are some other regulations 
promulgated by the State Council relating to the securities credit rating 
agencies and credit rating businesses, such as the Guidelines for Issuing 
Credit Reports by Credit Rating Agencies for the Bonds of Securities 
Companies and Company Bonds Control Regulation.15  However, these 
regulations and guidelines are incomplete and usually have only one or 
two provisions substantively related to credit rating, while the rest are 
mostly boilerplate.16  Therefore, in practice, the Interim Measures are the 
core regulation which applies to the securities credit rating agencies.  
Additionally, both securities law and the Interim Measures incorporate 
into their provisions fiduciary duty and duty of care, which are common 
law inventions. 17   Although the statements in these laws are rather 
generalized, they constitute the sources of legal authority for private 
parties as to when the credit rating agencies breach their fiduciary duties.   
These regulations lay out the threshold criteria for institutions 
wishing to submit application to CSRC in order to be accredited as credit 
ratings agencies.  Some of these threshold criteria have been regarded as 
hurdles which discourage necessary competition in the Chinese securities 
credit rating market.  At the end of 2008, there were only five designated 
securities credit rating agencies,18 all of which derived their designations 
                                                
14 See Interim Measures, supra note 12, at art. 2 (constituting the securities credit agency 
regulation of the People’s Republic of China). 
15 See Guidelines for Issuing Credit Reports for the Bonds of Securities Companies by 
Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 12. 
16 See Shi Fang [施放] et al., Woguo Xinyong Pingjiye Fazhan Xianzhuang ji Wenti Yanjiu 
[我国信用评级业发展现状及问题研究] [The Issues and Development Status of China’s 
Credit Rating System], 491 SHANGCHANG XIANDAIHUA [商场现代化 ] [MARKET 
MODERNIZATION] 396 (Jan. 2007) (discussing the meager and incomplete effect of 
regulation on credit rating).  
17 See 2005 Securities Law, supra note 13, at art. 152; Interim Measures, supra note 12, at 
art. 36. 
18 The five agencies as of December 31, 2008 were:  Zhong Cheng Xin Securities Credit 
Rating Co. Ltd.; Shanghai New Century Credit Rating & Investment Services Co. Ltd.; 
Peng Yuan Credit Rating Co. Ltd.; Da Gong International Credit Rating Co. Ltd.; and 
Tianjin Zhong Cheng Credit Rating Co. Ltd.  See China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, 
Congshi Zhengquan Shichang Zixin Pingji Yewu de Zixin Pingji Jigou Mingdan (Jiezhi 
2008 Nian 12 Yue 31 Ri [List of Approved Securities Credit Rating Institutions (as of Dec. 
31, 2008)], available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306205/200804/t20080430_23237.htm (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2010) (P.R.C.). 
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in 1990 when the CSRC began designating securities credit rating 
agencies.19  Subsequently, no new agencies have received designation. 
III. PREDICAMENTS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM IN CHINA 
It is hardly news that the burgeoning Chinese capital market is 
drawing global attention while foreign direct investment has continued to 
grow in the double digits.  Meanwhile, the State Council in 2010 
emphasized that China intended to continue attracting more international 
capital into its domestic capital market.20  A huge market demand for 
reliable ratings therefore still awaits the emergence of a mature domestic 
securities credit rating business.  However, current securities credit rating 
regulation is hardly keeping abreast with market developments. Many 
scholars believe that the regulatory framework is far from satisfactory and 
that a more substantive securities credit rating reform is imperative.21  
Generally, there are three major problems within the current securities 
                                                
19 The five agencies have maintained their advantage ever since they were included on the 
first approval list issued by the State Council, although some later changed their name.  
See People’s Bank of China, Guanyu Zhongguo Chengxin Zhengquan Pinggu Youxian 
Gongsi deng Jigou Congshi Qiye Zhaiquan Xinyong Pingji Yewu Zige de Tongzhi [关于中
国诚信证券评估有限公司等机构从事企业债券信用评级业资格的通知 ] [Notice 
Regarding Professional Qualification to Rate Enterprise Bonds of  China Chengxin 
Securities Credit Rating Co. Ltd. and Other Organizations] (issued by the People’s Bank 
of China, Dec. 16, 1997), 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/tiaofasi/584/1404/14045/14045_.html. 
20 See China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Liyong Wai 
Zi Gongzuo de Ruogan Yijian [国务院关于进一步 做好利用外资工作的若干意见] 
[State Council Opinion on Further Advancing the Use of Foreign Capital] (promulgated by 
the St. Council on Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-
04/13/content_1579732.htm (P.R.C.) (discussing the policy on foreign investment and 
encouraging more foreign capital investment).  In 2012, for the first time in a number of 
years, China surpassed the U.S. as the world’s leading recipient of foreign direct 
investment.  Jack Perkowski, China Leads in Foreign Direct Investment, FORBES.COM, 
Nov. 5, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jackperkowski/2012/11/05/china-leads-in-
foreign-direct-investment. 
21 See, e.g., He Minhua, supra note 7, at 56; Gao Han [高汉], Jinrong Weiji Beijing Xia de 
Xinyong Pingji Jigou Jianguan Wenti Fenxi—yi Meiguo Xinyong Pingji Jigou Jianguan 
wei Shijiao (金融危机背景下的信用评级机构监管问题分析—以美国信用评级机构监
管为视角) [Analysis of the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies in the Current Financial 
Crisis—Using the Regulation of American Credit Rating Agencies as a Comparison], 36.6 
HENAN SHIFAN DAXUE XUEB [河南示范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）] [J. OF HENAN 
NORMAL UNIV. (PHILOSOPHY & SOC. SCI. EDITION] 151 (Nov. 2009); Liu Yongming [柳永
明], Meiguo dui Xinyong Pingji Jigou de Jianguan: Zhenglun yu Qishi [美国对信用评级
机构的监管：争论与启示 ] [Inspiration from the U.S. Regulation of Credit Rating 
Agencies: Debate and Enlightenment], 12 SHANGHAI JINRONG [上海金融] [SHANGHAI FIN.] 
57 (2007). 
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credit rating system:  limited competition, rating shopping, and limited 
remedy for harms suffered as a consequence of false ratings. 
A. Limited Competition 
Credibility is crucial for credit rating agencies.  Through the 
accreditation process, a state licensing institution provides a credit rating 
agency with such credibility in the market.  In China’s credit rating market, 
private investors regard administrative agency licensing as highly reliable.  
As mentioned above, any agency performing credit rating must first 
acquire CSRC accreditation status.22  Article 226(2) of the Securities Law 
stipulates that: 
 
“[w]here an investment consulting institution, financial 
advising institution, credit rating institution, asset 
appraisal institution or accounting firm undertakes any 
securities trading service without [having first acquired] 
the relevant approval[s], it shall be ordered to correct 
[the situation].  The illegal proceeds [earned in the 
intervening period] shall be confiscated, and a fine from 
1 to 5 times the illegal proceeds shall be imposed upon 
it.”23 
 
This mechanism is similar to that of the United States.  In 1973 the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Rule 15c3-1,24 which 
incorporated ratings from any Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization (NRSRO).  This accreditation signals to the market that 
certain credit rating firms deserve a greater degree of confidence.  Only 
ten agencies have received the NRSRO status to date.25  But, while being 
designated by the SEC as an NRSRO is an elective procedure and simply 
benefits credit rating agencies by further guaranteeing their dominant 
status in the U.S. credit rating business,26 in China the CSRC licensing is 
mandatory.  This CSRC restriction has heightened the economic costs of 
competition.  The consequent lack of market competition over the past 
                                                
22 See Interim Measures, supra note 12 (stipulating that “[t]o engage in the [securities 
rating business], a credit rating agency shall, according to these Measures, apply to China 
Securities Regulatory Commission [(the “CSRC”)] to be licensed for the securities rating 
business,” and adding that “[w]ithout licensing by the CSCRC . . . , no entity or individual 
may engage in the securities rating business.”). 
23 See 2005 Securities Law, supra note 13, at art. 226. 
24 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (imposing net capital requirements for brokers and dealers in an 
SEC rule which incorporates ratings by NRSROs). 
25 See Arthur R. Pinto, supra note 5, at 348–49. 
26 See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets: Two Thumbs down 
for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH U. L.Q. 619 (1999). 
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twenty years has allowed the five licensed agencies to dominate and 
divide the market geographically, and to form exclusive connections with 
big-profile clients.  Some of these clients are nationally-operated state-
owned enterprises (SOEs).  As a result, the operation of credit ratings in 
China is far from transparent.  What’s more dangerous is that the agencies 
are upsettingly slow to the market.  These problems may be reminiscent of 
those that existed in the American credit rating industry before the Enron 
scandal.27 
B. Rating Shopping 
In addition to the problem of limited competition, the Chinese 
credit rating market suffers from excessive rating shopping.  Rating 
shopping occurs when rated institutions cherry-pick agencies that will 
provide them with better ratings.  This practice undermines the credibility 
of ratings, and poses hazards to the macro credit rating market.  Rating 
shopping arises from the moral hazard involved when rating agencies 
attempt to please clients issuing securities, rather than serving investors. 
Currently, there is no consensus as to the causes of rating 
shopping in the Chinese market.  While some U.S. scholars believe that 
intense competition among rating agencies leads to rating shopping,28 
some Chinese scholars argue that rating shopping would have happened in 
the Chinese market even with limited competition.29 
Better and more credible securities credit rating should facilitate 
security issuance and lower the cost of capital.30  The act of rating 
shopping adversely affects the credibility and accuracy of credit ratings.  
In practice, credit agencies face great pressure from clients, for whom 
ratings determine the cost of credit.  Thus, Chinese agencies consolidate 
their existing market share by offering clients better ratings.31  If the 
agencies prioritize professional integrity, they face a potential boycott 
from securities issuers.32  This leads to rating inflation.  Because no credit 
rating agency wants to lose the battle over market share, rating inflation 
has become rampant over the past 10 years.  Such rating inflation confuses 
investors and erodes the credibility and accuracy of credit ratings. 
C. Limited Remedy in Suits Against False Ratings 
                                                
27 See Arthur R. Pinto, supra note 5, at 349. 
28 Some United States scholars are opposed to lifting the NRSRO bar because they think 
competition will cause rating shopping.  See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE 
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 299–300 (2006). 
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Potential ex post liability through private enforcement is a means 
to control misbehavior by credit rating agencies.  In China, however, such 
means are rather limited.  In the United States, an issuer may bring suit on 
a claim of defamation for false or faulty ratings, while investors who act 
in reliance on such ratings might allege the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation and breach of the agency's duty of care.33  Although in 
China private parties can bring suit for defamation caused by an 
uncontracted agency’s retaliatory rating, the damage resulting from such 
defamation is always hard to prove and the courts grant little, if any, 
satisfactory compensation for intangible loss.  As a consequence, private 
parties have little incentive to sue for defamation.  Claims for breach of 
duty of care have thus become a major cause of action during recent years.  
Interim Measures Article 36 specifies that “[w]here a securities rating 
agency or any of its staff members fails to diligently fulfill duties or issues 
documents containing any false record, misleading statement or major 
omission, it shall be handled according to Article 223 of the Securities 
Law.”34  In addition, article 223 of the Securities Law specifies that: 
 
“[w]here a securities trading service institution fails to 
fulfill its accountability in a diligent and dutiful manner 
so that any document it formulated or produced has any 
false record, misleading statement or major omission, it 
shall be ordered to correct [it], shall have its business 
proceeds confiscated, shall have its license temporarily 
or permanently revoked, and shall pay a penalty of 
between one and five times its business proceeds.”35 
 
Ostensibly, there is a vehicle to sue unscrupulous credit rating 
agencies.  But in practice, litigation is far more difficult for both plaintiffs 
and judges to process.  In China’s legal system, there is no systematic 
theory of fiduciary duty because the notion of fiduciary duty was 
transplanted from common law jurisdictions.36  It is different from the 
American fiduciary duty system, which includes fiduciary duties in trust, 
guardianship, agencies and partnership.37  Chinese courts often find it hard 
                                                
33 See Carsten Thomas Ebenroth & Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The International Rating Game: 
An Analysis of the Liability of Rating Agencies in Europe, England, and the United States, 
24.3 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 783 (1993). 
34 See Interim Measures, supra note 12, at art. 36. 
35 2005 Securities Law, supra note 13, at art. 223. 
36 See Weng Xiaochuan, Anatomy of US Hostile Takeover Regulation: A Comparative 
Perspective of American and Chinese Takeover Regulations Judicial Independence in 
China (on file with author), at 7. 
37 See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1399 (2002) (discussing the U.S. legal system of fiduciary duties and proposing a 
new theory for unifying them). 
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to define what a fiduciary duty is or to adjust the standard of review case 
by case.  These systemic imperfections impede private parties from 
predicting the results of a lawsuit.  For this reason, many private parties do 
not receive fair remedies. 
IV. CREDIT RATING IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Development of the Credit Rating Industry in the US 
Rating agencies in the United States are organizations that issue 
ratings regarding the creditworthiness of an entity or a financial product of 
an entity.38  Their clients include credit issuers, investors, or other market 
participants whom the rating agencies charge for the service of processing 
relevant information.  Rating agencies usually use a quantitative or 
qualitative model to determine the creditworthiness of the subject by 
analyzing relevant financial information provided by their clients.39  One 
of the distinctive characteristics of credit ratings is that they usually focus 
on long-term risks.  Thus they tend to balance accuracy with stability in 
their assessment.40  This is partly due to the methodology the rating 
agencies adopt by incorporating franchise value evaluation, financial 
statement analysis, management quality and scenario analysis in their 
rating processes.41  Rating agencies exert influence on the credit markets 
by acting as middlemen filling the information gap between issuers and 
potential investors. 
 The credit rating system was first developed in the early twentieth 
century as a subscription-based business.42  The service was initially 
aimed at providing investors with information about the quality of 
corporate bonds.  During that time, individual investors were the main 
clients of rating agencies, as they provided revenues for agencies through 
subscription fees.43  Before 1975, the ratings industry remained primarily 
an enforcement tool for individual issuers and prospective creditors, who 
were the direct beneficiaries of the credit rating service. 
                                                
38 See Caitlin M. Mulligan, From AAA to F: How the Credit Rating Agencies Failed 
America and What Can Be Done to Protect Investors, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (2009). 
39 Id. 
40 Another unique feature of ratings is that they constitute a de facto “safety net” for 
auditors, as they serve a screening function.  As federal agencies increasingly base their 
regulatory decisions on the reports of rating agencies, the credit rating agency increasingly 
acts as a semi-public gatekeeper tasked with maintaining the general order of the financial 
markets.  We discuss this view later in this essay.  See also Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk 
After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach For Rating Agency 
Accountability, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1011, 1018 (2009). 
41 See Mulligan, supra note 38, at 1278–79. 
42  See Moody’s History: A Century of Market Leadership, MOODYS.COM, 
http://v3.moodys.com/Pages/atc001.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
43 See Mulligan, supra note 38, at 1279. 
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 A major change in the role of rating agencies took place in 1975, 
when the SEC established the concept of NRSROs through the no-action 
letter process.44  Once a rating agency is recognized as an NRSRO, the 
designation is not subsequently reviewed and is generally only revoked 
for serious malpractice.45 
 Since the late 1970s, the U.S. federal government began to rely 
increasingly on the rating agencies to make regulatory decisions.46  For 
example, the U.S. Department of Education uses ratings evaluated by 
NRSROs to set standards of financial responsibility for institutions 
wishing to participate in student financial assistance programs.  Also, 
several state insurance codes rely either directly or indirectly on NRSRO 
ratings to determine appropriate investments for insurance companies.47  
Congress also incorporated security ratings into other financial regulatory 
measures, including the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which prescribes 
that corporate debt securities are not investment grade unless they are 
rated in one of the four highest categories by at least one NRSRO.48  
These situations transformed rating agencies from a private enforcement 
tool into a semi-public gatekeeper.49 
 The result of this transformation is two-fold.  First, it greatly 
expanded the influence of rating agencies, especially agencies 
acknowledged as NRSROs by SEC.  The federal government’s reliance on 
credit ratings inadvertently created leverage in favor of rating agencies 
vis-à-vis investors, creditors, and other market participants.50  While those 
interest groups developed a growing dependence on credit ratings for their 
decision-making, credit issuers had an even stronger incentive to secure 
high credit ratings in order to obtain the accompanying economic 
privileges.51  All this made rating agencies a crucial and indispensible link 
in the security markets. 
                                                
44 The SEC first adopted the term “NRSRO” in 1975 for determining capital charges on 
different grades of debt securities under the Net Capital Rule.  The rule requires broker-
dealers to deduct from their net worth certain percentages of the market value of their 
proprietary securities.  The SEC determined that it was appropriate to apply a lower 
deduction for securities rated “investment grade” by a credit rating agency of national 
repute, as that would demonstrate that those securities typically were more liquid and less 
volatile in price than other lesser-rated securities.  The requirement that the credit rating 
agency be “nationally recognized” was designed to ensure that its ratings were credible 
and reasonably relied upon by the marketplace.  See SEC Report, supra note 6, at 6. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 6–8. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 By 2003, eight federal statues, forty-seven federal regulations and more than one 
hundred state laws and regulations had been written with reference to NRSRO ratings.  See 
Mulligan, supra note 38, at 1285–86. 
50 See Manns, supra note 40, at 1035–36. 
51 Id. 
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 Second, the transformation of rating agencies’ status from private 
to semi-public institutions changed the dynamics between rating agencies 
and their beneficiaries.52  Due to the huge economic rewards accorded to 
highly rated organizations, debt issuers actively seek the service of 
authoritative rating agencies like NRSROs.53  In an effort to secure a high 
rating, issuers sometimes purchase the consulting services of rating 
agencies regarding management structure, for example, and implement 
their advice.54  The old subscriber-based tradition thus became obsolete as 
issuers replaced the investor as more direct patrons of the credit rating 
agencies.55  As a result, there is a close relationship between rating 
agencies and issuers and a disconnect between rating agencies and the 
audience that relies on the credit ratings for decision-making. 
B. The Aftermath of the Enron Scandal and the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis 
The credibility of rating agencies faced grave challenges during the 
Enron crisis in 2001 and again in the recent subprime mortgage crisis.  
This led to serious scrutiny of the systematic weaknesses of the credit 
rating agencies by Congress and academia. 
In late 2001, Enron announced bankruptcy four days after three 
major NRSROs downgraded its credit rating.56  Investors, the federal 
government, and the public blamed the rating agencies for the delay in 
downgrading Enron, as they primarily relied on NRSROs as the frontline 
gatekeeper.57  Public scrutiny of the credit rating system came later, in 
October 2002, when Congress held a hearing regarding heightened 
oversight for the rating agencies.58  Pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, the SEC conducted its own survey, and later published findings 
claiming that the SEC’s oversight on rating agencies was necessary to 
improve transparency and enhance the orderliness of the industry.59  Soon 
after, in 2006, Congress enacted the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, 
granting the SEC statutory authority to monitor rating agencies, which 
was implemented by the SEC in 2007.60 
 The rating agencies were questioned again in 2008 during the 
subprime mortgage crisis.  Many subprime residential mortgage-backed 
                                                
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Mulligan, supra note 38, at 1294. 
55 Manns, supra note 40, at 1015. 
56 The equity holders of Enron lost over sixty billion dollars, while the creditors of Enron 
held thirteen billion dollars of debt.  Id. at 1040–41. 
57 Mulligan, supra note 38, at 1284–85. 
58 Id. at 1285. 
59 Id. at 1287. 
60 Id. at 1287–88. 
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securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) defaulted 
and were subsequently subject to ratings downgrades.61  While economic 
observers admitted that other private actors were also to blame for the 
crisis, including mortgage brokers, investment banks, and purchasers who 
took excessively high risks, rating agencies were among those held as the 
most culpable.62  With the emergence of increasingly globalized financial 
markets, increasingly complex financial products and services, and the 
expanding debt market, investor’s reliance on rating agencies as the 
frontline screener has only been growing, despite all its shortcomings.  
Yet once again, rating agencies were viewed as failing in their duty as 
gatekeeper to filter out unqualified entities and toxic financial products.  
This time, commentators summarized the weakness of the credit rating 
system as a combination of lax oversight by the SEC, fatal shortcomings 
of corporate self-governance, gross negligence on the part of rating 
agencies, and compromised corporate integrity.63 
C. Problems of the U.S. Credit Rating Industry, and Solutions 
Some commentators posit that there are three major concerns 
regarding the credit rating system:  lack of competition, huge conflicts of 
interest, and accountability issues of rating agencies.  These three issues 
have long been at the heart of the controversy over the credit rating 
industry and its possible reform even before the subprime mortgage 
crisis.64  In response, the judicial system and the SEC—armed with the 
regulatory authority provided in the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
2006—created regulations and oversight measures targeting the three 
issues. 
1.  Remedies for the Lack of Competition 
The three most reputable NRSROs in the United States—also 
known as the “Big Three”—are Moody’s Investor Services, Fitch Ratings, 
and Standard and Poor’s.65  The three rating agencies issue ninety-eight 
percent of all ratings.66  The Big Three have dominated the credit rating 
market as early as 1975 after being designated as NRSROs by the SEC.67  
                                                
61 Id. at 1289. 
62 The rating agencies’ strongest defense against critiques of their role in the subprime 
mortgage crisis probably is that both RMBS and CDO are designed specifically to take 
advantage of loopholes in agencies’ evaluation models in order to secure high ratings.  See 
Manns, supra note 40, at 1042. 
63 Id. at 1039. 
64 Mulligan, supra note 38, at 1295–97. 
65 Id. at 1279. 
66 Id. 
67 See SEC Report, supra note 6, at 5. 
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Concerns arose about a monopoly of the credit rating market by the Big 
Three, as a dearth of competition usually leads to deterioration in products 
and services and breeds corruption within an industry.68  Also, questions 
arose regarding entry-level requirements for recognition as an NRSRO.69 
Before the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, no clear 
definition pertaining to an NRSRO or guidelines regarding the 
qualifications for NRSRO were available.70  In an effort to standardize the 
credit rating industry, and alleviate public frustration over the lack of 
credibility of rating agencies, Congress enacted the Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006 granting the SEC authority to govern the application 
process of an NRSRO.71  In particular, it required the SEC to set clear 
standards and criteria regarding the application and approval of an 
NRSRO. 72   Subsequently, the SEC promulgated a guide entitled 
“Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,” in which the SEC gave a 
brief outline of the application procedure and listed information to be 
disclosed by institutions wishing to become an NRSRO.73  It was believed 
that following this type of formalistic approach would improve 
transparency and promote competition among rating agencies. 
While critics doubt that the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
2006 will change the dominant status of the Big Three in the short term,74 
most observers believe it will help spur competition in the long run.75  As 
of late 2011, there are nine NRSROs in the United States, although the 
                                                
68 Id. at 24. 
69 Id.  
70 It was partly due to the fact that before the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, 
the SEC did not have the statutory authority to oversee rating agencies.  See Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act, infra note 72.  Some laissez-faire commentators were worried that 
SEC’s interference would disrupt the self-regulation of the credit rating industry.  See 
Mulligan, supra note 38, at 1286–87. 
71 Mulligan, supra note 38, at 1286–87. 
72 See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327, 
1327–29 (2006) [hereinafter Credit Rating Agency Reform Act] (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. 78a & 78o-7), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-
120/pdf/STATUTE-120-Pg1327.pdf. 
73 Id.  
74 To accumulate skills, capital and public acknowledgement needs time, and the mere 
recognition of an NRSRO by the SEC is far from sufficient for a new NRSRO to survive 
the market.  Just because smaller fish are now allowed to enter the market, it does not 
mean the Big Three will be much pressured, at least not in the short term.  Also some 
commentators point out that the market probably does not need any more rating agencies, 
as the current number proves sufficient.  Another concern as to spurring competition is the 
phenomenon of rating shopping.  As issuers are now able to shop around for better ratings, 
they have more leverage than before.  Therefore in order to attract clients, rating agencies 
may compromise on their autonomy, and the market as a whole will suffer.  See Mulligan, 
supra note 38, at 1292. 
75 Id. 
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Big Three are still the tycoons in the credit rating markets.76  Observers 
point out that the sheer number of new rating agencies will exert pressure 
on the Big Three, and that the burgeoning smaller rating agencies will 
claim greater market share, in turn restructuring the credit rating 
industry.77 
2.  Remedies for Conflicts of Interest 
 As mentioned above, because numerous federal laws and 
regulations tie credit ratings to the ability to issue debt; the landscape of 
credit ratings has been transformed into one where it is almost mandatory 
for issuers to purchase ratings from rating agencies.78  A more intimate 
connection therefore exists between rating agencies and issuers—while 
the direct financial tie between rating agencies and investors becomes 
more attenuated.79  This situation provides incentives for rating agencies 
to turn a blind eye to some suspicious behavior that otherwise might lead 
to downgrades.80  Enron is a fine example of this systemic shortcoming.  
In addition, rating agencies now provide consulting services where they 
recommend certain corporate structures and asset allocations that translate 
into higher ratings.81  Some are suspicious that when a client purchases 
and follows consulting advice, they are more likely to obtain a high credit 
rating.82  This leads to concerns that rating agencies will be biased against 
the issuers who do not purchase their consulting services and will tend to 
be more lenient to the ones who do.83 
 In the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Congress 
specifically targeted the issue of NRSROs’ management of conflicts of 
                                                
76  The other seven NRSROs are:  A.M. Best Company, Dominion Bond Rating Service, 
Egan-Jones Rating Company, Japan Credit Rating Agency, LACE Financial Corp, Rating 
Investment Information, Inc., and Realpoint, LLC.  See Credit Rating Agencies—Globally, 
DEFAULTRISK.COM, http://www.defaultrisk.com/rating_agencies.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 
2010). 
77 Mulligan, supra note 38, at 1296–97. 
78 Id. at 1285–86. 
79 See Manns, supra 40, at 1022. 
80 Id. 
81 SEC Report, supra note 6, at 45. 
82 Id. 
83  Rating agencies usually respond to these concerns by arguing that the financial 
remuneration they obtain from issuers only occupy a small percentage of their total income.  
In addition, they highly value objective and accurate ratings, which is crucial to their 
reputation, and they indicate that they will in no way compromise on that for mere short-
term gain.  However, criticism of this reputational defense points out that good faith alone 
is not enough to mitigate financial interest, however small; while public scrutiny may play 
a part in monitoring rating agencies, it cannot totally offset the market influence.  See 
Manns, supra 40, at 1048. 
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interests with its patrons.84  The SEC expressly mandated disclosure—or 
otherwise the prohibition—of any business affiliation between an NRSRO 
and obligors on which the agency provided ratings, where the NRSRO 
might offer higher crediting ratings in compensation or as a means to 
acquiring leverage.85  In addition, the SEC prohibited an NRSRO from all 
forms of coercive practices whereby the NRSRO may condition a better 
credit rating on purchase of its consulting services, or require a portion of 
the client’s financial instruments to be rated by it.86  Without any more 
fundamental change to the “issuer-pays” model, such measures can be 
seen as progress towards regulating such relationships within the existing 
framework. 
3.  Remedies for Agencies’ Lack of Accountability 
Suits against rating agencies usually come from two sources:  
issuers who allege that their financial product was poorly rated, or by 
investors who suffered loss due to their reliance on the ratings.87 
In the first case, issuers usually seek to establish a defamation or 
libel claim, alleging that the negative ratings are not consistent with the 
actual creditworthiness of their financial product and claiming economic 
harm ensuing from such ratings.  Usually, courts will require plaintiffs to 
establish three elements to sustain a claim of defamation:  (1) that the 
publication of such ratings is a factual allegation, not mere opinion; (2) 
that the plaintiff is a private and not a public institution or organization; 
and (3), that the subject matter of such rating is of private concern.88  Of 
the three elements, the first generally proves to be the biggest hurdle for 
issuers. Rating agencies traditionally hold out their ratings as journalistic 
                                                
84 See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, supra note 72, at § 15E(h) (requiring NSROs to 
“establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed . . . 
to address and manage any conflicts of interest that can arise from such business,” and 
authorizing the SEC to issue final rules requiring management and disclosure of such 
conflicts of interest). 
85 See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, supra note 72, at § 15E(h). 
86 See id. at § 15E(i) (“The Commission shall issue final rules . . . to prohibit any act or 
practice relating to issuance of credit ratings . . . that the Commission determines to be 
unfair, coercive or abusive, including any practice relating to— (A) conditioning or 
threatening to condition the issuance of a credit rating on a purchase by the obligor or an 
affiliate thereof of other services or products . . . of the [NSRO]; . . . (C) modifying or 
threatening to modify a credit rating or otherwise departing from its adopted systematic 
procedures and methodologies in determining credit ratings, based on whether the obligor, 
or an affiliate of the obligor, purchases or will purchase the credit rating or any other 
service or product of the [NSRO] or any person associated with such organization.”). 
87 See Jonathan S. Sack & Stephen M. Juris, Rating Agencies: Civil Liability Past and 
Future, 238 N.Y. L.J. 88 (2007), available at. 
http://www.maglaw.com/publications/articles/00144/_res/id=Attachments/index=0/070110
70002Morvillo.pdf. 
88 See Ebenroth & Dillon, supra note 33, at 834. 
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opinions, which are therefore protected under the First Amendment.89  
This journalistic opinion defense has provided rating agencies with virtual 
immunity from civil liability for their ratings.  In recent years, in order to 
sustain a defamation claim, courts also put emphasis on proof of actual 
malice by rating agencies in their issuance of a negative rating.90  Even in 
situations where the issuers, instead of raising a defamation claim, are 
primarily seeking to establish negligence and breach of good faith against 
rating agencies based upon a contractual relationship between the two, 
some federal courts have struck down such a cause of action, reasoning 
that issuers must still prove actual malice.91 
As for suits brought by investors, there are two categories of 
cases:  first, suits brought by subscribers who made business decisions 
according to ratings published by rating agencies to which the investor 
subscribed; and second, suits brought by investors who contracted directly 
with rating agencies for consultancy.92 
In the case of subscribers, the major hurdle is to establish a degree 
of privity as a third party beneficiary of such ratings before they can 
further their tortious claim.93  As for the second group of investor suits, 
the plaintiffs usually seek to establish a negligence claim by way of 
negligent misrepresentation. 94   However, even in these cases, rating 
agencies’ First Amendment defense may defeat such claims.95  Courts 
may still find such ratings to be journalistic opinions and require investors 
to prove actual malice,96 or courts may determine that the investors’ 
reliance was unreasonable in light of rating agencies’ disclaimer that their 
                                                
89 See Sack & Juris, supra note 87 (“The rating agencies traditionally have avoided 
liability for their ratings, in part because of the presumption that they are independent 
financial reporters.”). 
90 See Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs. Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 527–28 (6th Cir. 
2007) (affirming the District Court and finding that Compuware had failed to provide 
sufficient evidence of actual malice to withstand summary judgment). 
91 See id. at 531. 
92 Ebenroth & Dillon, supra note 33, at 803–05. 
93 Id. at 803. 
94 Or via a common law fraud claim.  But the standard is similar to that applicable to a 
negligent misrepresentation claim.  Courts often shift the burden of proof on the plaintiff to 
show the following elements are present, in order to sustain a negligent misrepresentation 
claim:  (1) a false statement of material fact; (2) carelessness or negligence in ascertaining 
the truth of the statement by defendant; (3) an intention to induce the other party to act; (4) 
action by the other party in reliance on the truth of the statements; (5) damages to the other 
party resulting from such reliance; and (6) a duty owed by defendant to plaintiff to 
communicate accurate information.  Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 168 F.3d 331, 
335 (7th Cir. 1999). 
95 See In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & "ERISA'' Litigation, 511 F.Supp.2d 742, 
809–10 (2005). 
96 See id. at 811–12. 
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ratings were not recommendations to purchase or invest in such financial 
instruments.97 
While the First Amendment defense has greatly shielded rating 
agencies from civil liability, there are heated discussions over whether it 
would be appropriate to expose rating agencies to greater accountability.98  
Moreover, the recent subprime mortgage crisis has put more pressure on 
judicial and legislative systems to reassess their approach to the credit 
rating industry.  The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009 
required heightened transparency by NRSROs as to their credit rating 
methodologies, internal controls, and reports of their independence from 
issuers;99 together with the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, this showed a general legislative tendency towards enhancing the 
scope of rating agencies’ liability and shrinking areas in which they may 
enjoy immunity.100   
V. INSPIRATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CREDIT RATING IN 
CHINA 
A. Suggestion on the Lack of Competition and Rating 
Shopping Issues 
One hurdle for promoting competition in China’s credit rating 
industry is the lack of definitive legal guidance.  As mentioned before, 
while several regulatory ordinances have been issued throughout the years, 
the only one providing substantive rules specifically applicable to credit 
agencies has been the Interim Measures.101  However, even the Interim 
Measures ordinance has its critical defects:  not only does it impose high 
entry requirements on applicants seeking to become nationally-recognized 
credit rating agencies,102 but it is ambiguous on the criteria CSRC is to use 
in qualifying or disqualifying an applicant.  As a result, an applicant has to 
jump two hurdles before its application can be approved—first, it has to 
meet the high threshold requirement; and second, not knowing how CSRC 
                                                
97 See Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., supra note 94, at 336. 
98 See Mulligan, supra note 38, at 1296. 
99 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009 (Comm. Print 2009), §§ 931–32, 
available at 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=9
43242e1-ca66-411c-89e2-8954eb3fc085; a section-by-section summary of the Act, 
proposed by Senator Dodd, is available at 
http://www.politico.com/static/PPM130_section_by_section_11_16_09.html (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2010). 
100 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
111publ203/content-detail.html (last visited Oct.12, 2010). 
101 See Interim Measures, supra note 12. 
102 See Interim Measures, supra note 12, at Provisions 7(1)–(2). 
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will judge its application, it faces unpredictable, if not arbitrary 
administrative decisions.  We will now discuss those two problems in 
detail. 
First, the entry requirement listed in the Interim Measures is too 
high a threshold for most applicants.  For example, Provision 7(1) requires 
a qualified credit agency to have total net assets of at least RMB 20 
million.103  This provision alone bars most private agencies at the doorstep.  
In addition, Provision 7(2) requires qualified credit agencies to have 
personnel consisting of at least twenty credit rating evaluators, ten of 
whom have to be senior evaluators with more than three years of working 
experience.104  Considering the fact that the credit rating industry in China 
was only established in 2000, evaluators with such experience are still rare 
even in a burgeoning industry.105  In fact, there is currently a deficit of 
professional evaluators working for credit rating agencies in China, which 
means that CSRC cannot afford to be so demanding yet, and should not 
set the bar so high.106  These two provisions, taken together, set daunting 
requirements on both the “hard” and “soft” assets of the potential 
applicant agencies.  
The situation China faces differs from that in the United States.  
The credit rating market in the United States grew and matured as early as 
the start of the 1900s.107  By the 1950s, the monopoly of the Big Three 
emerged, and fundamental parameters of the industry had been established 
and acknowledged.  Insurgent smaller rating agencies unsatisfied with a 
static market had over a century to grow and amass a fair amount of 
knowledge, capital, and personnel.  In view of the relatively short history 
and insufficient development of China’s credit rating industry, a lower 
entry requirement—regarding both capital and personnel—would be more 
helpful for the purpose of promoting competition in the industry, than is 
possible through the mere listing of application procedures. 108  
Concededly, this may for a certain period of time dilute the average 
quality of rating services.  However, many scholars believe that breaking 
the monopoly of the Chinese “Big Five” and encouraging fledgling rating 
agencies would, in the long run, create a healthy industry, which would be 
worth the temporary downgrade in service quality for the interim.109 
Second, while the Interim Measures lists in detail the procedural 
requirements for applicant submissions, including mandatory disclosure of 
certain information, the statutory language mentions nothing regarding the 
substantive criteria CSRC uses in evaluating the application material after 
                                                
103 Id. at Provision 7(1). 
104 Id. at Provision 7(2). 
105 See Shi Fang et al., supra note 16, at 396. 
106 Id. 
107 See Moody’s History, supra note 42. 
108 See Wang & Dong, supra note 8, at 63–64. 
109 Id. 
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it has been submitted.  CSRC is also silent in response to the public 
demand for exact doctrinal guidance on how it assesses applicants; for 
example, the grounds for disqualification, and any redeeming measures 
disqualified applicants can take, are unclear.  CSRC’s ambiguous posture 
in this regard upsets the public, and furthers commentators’ suspicions 
about the lack of transparency and democracy in CSRC’s internal 
governance mechanisms.110 
To improve the situation, the Chinese state legislature should refer 
to the precedents of its U.S. counterpart.  The Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006 serves as a model statute for setting criteria and 
standards for evaluating the qualification of applicants.  In particular, it 
requires the SEC to state grounds for a denial of licensure, based on an 
applicant’s rating methodologies, internal structures, code of ethics, and 
implementation of policies against misuse of confidential information, 
among other factors.111  Similarly, China’s legislature may want to build a 
more substantial and workable framework, comparable to that in the 
United States, for providing guidance and clarification on the relevant 
criteria.  
When it comes to the regulation of rating shopping, scholars 
believe that in every country it is necessary to scrutinize and strictly 
supervise conflicts of interest between rating agencies and issuers.112  As 
to the supervision and regulation of such conflicts of interest, CSRC is at a 
slightly more advantageous position than the SEC, because the CSRC is 
designated with full authority by the State Council and relevant statutes to 
regulate credit rating agencies.113  The Interim Measures clearly state that 
CSRC has the authority to supervise and penalize rating agencies which 
abuse the credit rating system.114   In addition, the Interim Measures 
prohibit rating agencies from rating any institutions in which the agencies 
have more than a 5% share.115  The Interim Measures create a duty of 
“recusal” for rating agencies, banning them from rating institutions in 
which any agency employee or close relatives of such employee work.  It 
also applies to require recusal of an agency where one or more of its 
employees hold more than 5% of the equity interests in the institution to 
be rated,116 sit on the board of directors, or work as a senior executive,117 
as a legal or financial consultant, or as an auditor,118 or have previously 
                                                
110 Id. 
111 See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, supra note 72, at § 15E(a)(2)(A)–(C). 
112 See SEC Report, supra note 6; Wang & Dong, supra note 8. 
113 See Interim Measures, supra note 12. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at Provision 12(1). 
116 Id. at Provision 13(1). 
117 Id. at Provision 13(2). 
118 Id. at Provision 13(3). 
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engaged in transactions with such institution accumulating to RMB 
500,000 or more.119 
However, these provisions are only aimed at direct conflicts of 
interest.  The P.R.C. state legislature may want to expand the scope of this 
provision to include indirect conflicts, in a way similar to what the Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 does.120  Such indirect conflicts arise 
in situations where the rating agencies may be biased in their rating when 
offering rating consulting services to clients, as well as other situations 
involving possible favoritism on behalf of rated companies, which tend to 
arise as a result of a rated-client oriented system. 
B. Thoughts on Liability of Rating Agencies 
As mentioned before, to improve the performance of rating 
agencies in China, it is crucial to improve private enforcement.  However, 
the major current obstacle to an effective system for private enforcement 
is the incompleteness of applicable law.  As in other countries, defamation, 
duty of loyalty and duty of care causes of action are a major feature under 
the current formal Chinese legal framework.  Unfortunately, almost none 
of these casues of action turns out to be effective in practice. 
According to Chinese law, a business organization can claim 
defamation when its reputation is infringed upon.121  Unlike in America, 
freedom of speech is not a valid defense,122 even though such rights are 
protected under several provisions in the Constitution of People’s 
Republic of China.123  Courts will generally not even hear a case in which 
claims are based solely on constitutional rights.124  Therefore, a freedom 
                                                
119 Interim Measures, supra note 12, at Provision 13(4). 
120 See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, supra note 72, at § 15E(h)–(i). 
121 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze [中华人民共和国民法通则 ] 
[General Principles of Civil Law] art. 120 (1986) (P.R.C.) (“If a citizen's right of personal 
name, portrait, reputation or honour is infringed upon, he shall have the right to demand 
that the infringement be stopped, his reputation be rehabilitated, the ill effects be 
eliminated and an apology be made; he may also demand compensation for losses.”), 
available at http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-
02/11/content_21898337.htm (Chinese version available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/8217/39932/2944727.html).  The General Principles 
of Civil Law is the civil law code of People’s Republic of China. 
122 See Zhang Hong [张红], Shishi Chenshu, Yijian Biaoda yu Gongyixing Yanlun Baohu 
[事实陈述，意见表达和公益性言论保护] [Protection of Factual Statements, Expression 
of Opinions and Speech in the Public Interest], 3 FALÜ KEXUE [L. SCIENCE] 106 (2010). 
123  See, e.g., XIANFA [中华人民共和国宪法 ] arts. 35, 41, 47 (1986), available at 
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (Chinese version available at 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_62714.htm). 
124 See Minshi Anjian Anyou Guiding［民事案件案由规定］[Rules on Causes of Action 
in Civil Cases] (2007) (P.R.C.) (as amended, 2011), available at http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=344334.  The Rules on Causes of Action in Civil Cases 
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of speech-based defense is invalid for rating agencies in China.  However, 
this does not mean defamation suits will be more favorable to the plaintiff.  
While there are a series of judicial comments and notes on the definition 
of defamation, they are just enumerated as a laundry list of possible 
situations which could constitute defamation. 125  The law is silent on how 
to measure damage, which is now a major problem for defamation suits. 
In most cases, the courts are reluctant to award large damages based on 
intangible harm alone. This is partly due to the fact that the intangible 
assets market is underdeveloped.  The courts’ reluctance also results from 
the difficulty of proving a causal relationship between defamatory 
expression and later substantial harm suffered.  The plaintiff usually 
cannot get satisfactory compensation from a defamation suit.  To solve the 
problem of the lack of any defined way for conducting damage 
measurement, a statutory or judicial clarification is needed.  But this will 
require a more mature market overall, that better understands intangible 
loss.126 
While the obstacles to defamation suits in China will not be 
eliminated anytime soon, the legal framework of fiduciary duty can still 
be improved as an alternative to facilitate more effective private 
enforcement.  As mentioned previously, although the Interim Measures 
Articles 36 and 223 of the Securities Law have epitomized the contour of 
rating agencies’ fiduciary duty, judges still find it hard to apply the rules.  
The law says nothing about which party should bear the burden of proof in 
the adjudication of such matters. 
Fiduciary duties are highly contextual127 and therefore are one of 
the most elusive concepts in Anglo-American law.128  There are several 
                                                                                                           
constitute a judicial explanation by the Supreme People’s Court on what kind of cases can 
be admitted and heard by a court. 
125 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Guanche Zhixing “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Minfa Tongze” Ruogan Wenti de Yijian (Shixing) [最高人民法院关于贯彻执行‹‹中华人
民共和国民法通则 ››若干问题的意见 (试行 )] [Several Issues Concerning the 
Implementation of the ‘General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China’ 
(Trial Implementation)] § 140 (1987) (P.R.C.) (providing a judicial explanation of the civil 
law code of People’s Republic of China), available at http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=203; see also Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli 
Mingyuquan Anjian Ruogan Wenti de Jieda [最高人民法院关于审理名誉权案件若干问
题的解答] [Answers of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning 
Defamation Adjudications] Q7 (1993) (P.R.C.) (providing a judicial explanation on the 
appropriate conduct of defamation adjudications), available at http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=239. 
126 Intangible assets used to be a puzzling issue in the U.S. too.  U.S. corporate law used to 
deny the legitimacy of purchasing shares by contributing intangible assets, because it was 
very hard to value the intangible assets.  See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic 
Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992). 
127 See, e.g., Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1399 (2002); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: an Analysis of 
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L. J. 879 (1988). 
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compelling theories to explain the fiduciary relationship.  The most widely 
accepted proposition is the contract theory by Frank Easterbrook and 
Daniel Fischel.  According to this theory, “a ‘fiduciary’ relation is a 
contractual one characterized by unusually high costs of specification and 
monitoring.”129  In the credit rating context, it is very crucial to determine 
the contractual relationship in order to decide whether a fiduciary 
relationship exists.  Therefore, if there is no contract between plaintiff and 
defendant, a fiduciary relationship will not exist.  This is the simplest and 
therefore the most workable principle for guideline-reliant Chinese 
judges.130 
Some Chinese scholars have already embarked on studies 
regarding the burden of proof issue.131  According to rating guidelines 
issued by CSRC, instead of proving the correctness of the result per se, 
the litigants should focus more on proving that the rating result is derived 
through a proper procedure.132   Imposing this burden of proof on a 
plaintiff usually means the plaintiff will lose.  This is because credit rating 
is a highly professionalized and information-demanding business, and 
usually the only strategy plaintiffs can adopt is to make a causation claim.  
This claim is almost always rebutted by hindsight bias theory.133 
If the court instead requires the defendant rating agency to prove 
that its rating results are appropriate, then rating agencies will have to 
disclose their rating methodology in court.  This will improve the 
transparency of the rating procedure and rating methodologies employed 
by agencies.  In the meantime, plaintiffs have a chance to rebut the 
defense as long as agencies are shown to have failed to follow proper 
                                                                                                           
128 See DeMott, supra note 127, at 879. 
129 See Frank H Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & 
ECON. 425, 427 (1993). 
130 See Charlie Xiao-Chuan Weng, Assessing the Applicability of the Business Judgment 
Rule and the ‘Defensive’ Business Judgment Rule in the Chinese Judiciary: A Perspective 
on Takeover Dispute Adjudication, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 124, 133–138 (2010) 
(discussing the composition of China’s corporate judiciary, and the manner in which 
economically-dependent judges tend to prefer guidance from higher-level courts over 
making their own judgments as to particular cases). 
131 See Luo Peixin [罗培新], Hou Jinrong Weiji Shidai Xinyong Pingji Jigou Falü Zeren 
zhi Wan Shan [后金融危机时代信用评级机构法律责任之完善] [Improvements in Legal 
Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies in the Aftermath the Financial Crises], 7 FAXUE 
ZAZHI [J. OF L.] 5 (2009). 
132 See Guidelines for Issuing Credit Reports for the Bonds of Securities Companies by 
Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 12; see also Luo, supra note 131, at 7. 
133 Experimental psychology has shown that on hindsight, people consistently arrive at an 
outcome that could have been anticipated in foresight.  See ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL 
CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 119–20 (1988); Baruch Fischhoff, For Those 
Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341–43 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); 
Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, ‘I Knew It Would Happen’: Remembered Probabilities of 
Once-Future Things, 13 ORG. BEHAV. AND HUM. PERFORMANCE 1, 1–16 (1975). 
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procedures and legitimate methods.  However, if the rating result is 
derived through such appropriate procedures and methods, then agencies 
cannot be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty.  Otherwise, the credit 
rating industry would become an excessively high-risk business. 
